AI & LLM

AI Agent Security Testing

Testing autonomous and tool-using agents for unsafe actions and privilege abuse.

Overview

AI agent security testing evaluates autonomous, tool-using agents for unsafe actions — tool-invocation abuse, privilege creep, and context poisoning — that arise when an LLM can actually do things, not just answer.

What we test

Where attackers get in — and where we look.

Tool-invocation abuse

Privilege & scope creep

Memory & context poisoning

Chained-action risk

Human-in-the-loop bypass

How we test

A proof-driven methodology.

Scope & recon

We agree objectives and rules of engagement, then map what you actually expose.

Map the attack surface

Enumerate entry points, roles, and trust boundaries a real attacker would target.

Manual exploitation

Certified testers exploit flaws by hand — chaining issues scanners never connect.

Prove impact

Every finding ships with a working, reproducible proof-of-exploit and business context.

Report & retest

Risk-ranked report with fixes, then a retest that confirms each issue is closed.

What you get

Proof you can act on.

Reproducible proof-of-exploit

Every finding ships with a working exploit and evidence.

Risk-ranked report

CVSS + business context, prioritized for your team.

Remediation guidance

Actionable fixes mapped to each finding.

Retest to verified fix

We confirm closure — proof it’s fixed, not assumed.

Related programs

Make it continuous.

Pair this test with a program that keeps coverage live between engagements.

FAQ

AI Agent Security Testing — questions buyers ask.

Why do AI agents need dedicated testing?

Agents can invoke tools, call APIs, and take actions, so a single manipulation can cause real-world impact — a much larger blast radius than a chatbot.

What is excessive agency?

Excessive agency is when an agent has more permissions or autonomy than needed, letting a manipulated agent perform harmful actions. We test for and help scope it down.

Do you test multi-agent systems?

Yes — including chained actions and agent-to-agent interactions where trust and context can be abused.

Prove what an attacker could actually do.

A short scoping call, no obligation.