Red Team

AI Red Teaming

Adversarial testing of AI systems against misuse, jailbreaks, and harmful-output scenarios.

Overview

AI red teaming is adversarial testing of AI systems against misuse — jailbreaks, guardrail bypass, and harmful-output scenarios — to show how your model behaves under determined, creative attack.

What we test

Where attackers get in — and where we look.

Jailbreak & guardrail bypass

Harmful-content elicitation

Data-exfiltration paths

Tool & agent abuse

Abuse-scenario coverage

How we test

A proof-driven methodology.

Scope & recon

We agree objectives and rules of engagement, then map what you actually expose.

Map the attack surface

Enumerate entry points, roles, and trust boundaries a real attacker would target.

Manual exploitation

Certified testers exploit flaws by hand — chaining issues scanners never connect.

Prove impact

Every finding ships with a working, reproducible proof-of-exploit and business context.

Report & retest

Risk-ranked report with fixes, then a retest that confirms each issue is closed.

What you get

Proof you can act on.

Reproducible proof-of-exploit

Every finding ships with a working exploit and evidence.

Risk-ranked report

CVSS + business context, prioritized for your team.

Remediation guidance

Actionable fixes mapped to each finding.

Retest to verified fix

We confirm closure — proof it’s fixed, not assumed.

Related programs

Make it continuous.

Pair this test with a program that keeps coverage live between engagements.

FAQ

AI Red Teaming — questions buyers ask.

How is AI red teaming different from LLM pentesting?

LLM pentesting targets the application’s technical security; AI red teaming focuses on model behavior — jailbreaks, harmful content, and misuse scenarios at scale.

Do you test guardrails and safety filters?

Yes — we test how reliably guardrails hold under adversarial prompting and where they can be bypassed.

What frameworks guide the testing?

We draw on OWASP LLM, MITRE ATLAS, and emerging AI-safety practice to structure abuse-scenario coverage.

Prove what an attacker could actually do.

A short scoping call, no obligation.